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Abstract. The 2008 global crisis that hit in the heart of the system highlighted main 
deficiencies and vulnerabilities of the current international monetary system and revived 
the old concerns about its functioning. The reform of the international monetary system is 
under discussion again after a long period, during the ’90 crises, especially in Southeast 
Asia, Russia and Brazil. To explain the relation between crisis and reform, this paper 
identifies some variables and hypotheses. It also analyses the matters that have sparked 
interest in reforming the international monetary system, in the context of the causes of the 
crisis and its vulnerabilities, admitting that the current system is not a perfect one. The 
paper concludes that it is time for a deep reform of the international monetary system. 
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1.  Some interpretations of the relation between crisis and reform  
Rodrik (1996, p. 26) believes that is a tautology to associate reform with crisis, 
the reform naturally becomes a problem when policies do not work, that a crisis is 
actually an extreme case of failure of the policy and therefore “reform should 
follow the crisis”. The author suggests that one reason why the hypothesis has not 
been tested empirically is that it cannot be rejected; in its opinion the hypothesis is 
being nonfalsifiable.  
On the other hand, Drazen and Easterly (2001) argue that if one can distinguish 
between different versions of the argument “reform follows crisis”, then the most 
sensible version is both non-tautological and testable.  
To explain the relation between crisis and reform, economic literature identifies a 
number of variables: 
  Crisis, which induce reform (Alesina, Drazen, 1991); 
  Time, which shows not only the severity of the crisis but also its duration, 
political actors and interactions between factors (Drazen, 2009); 
  Legal framework: Abiad and Mody (2003) find that a financial crisis slows or 
reverses deregulation, with the reform meaning; Helleiner and Pagliari (2010) 
emphasize the relation between crisis and international financial regulation 
reform; Franklin and Carletti (2010) consider the need for reform in the 
governance and regulation of central banks to minimize the risk of future 
crises; Dabrowski (2010) stresses the architectural elements missing from EU 
financial supervision and those that can help strengthen global coordination of 
policy and regulation; 
  National, regional and international institutions: Fischer (2003) examines the 
role of IMF reforms in crisis prevention and management; Pop-Eleches (2009) 
explains the IMF's response to economic crises in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe and demonstrates that an economic crisis triggered economic 
neoliberal reforms only when the government and the IMF agree on the roots 
and the severity of the crisis; Petri and Plummer (2009) stress the need for 
new institutions in policies cooperation; Moshirian (2011) argues that in fact 
the crisis lead to new national and international institutions (for example, the 
Federal Reserve System in 1914, in the aftermath of the banking crisis of 
1907; the IMF and IBRD in 1944, after de Second World War; the Financial 
Stability Forum and the G20 Forum of Finance Ministers, after the Asian 
crisis; G20 and the Financial Stability Board during the current crisis).  International monetary system – between crisis and reform 
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Drazen (2009) notes that there are four approaches to the question of whether a 
crisis triggers reform, which he calls the “crisis hypotheses”: 
  Crisis modifies the perception of the need for a change;  
  Crisis makes each interest group to be more open to reform;  
  Crisis weakens powerful interest groups that block reform; 
  An extremely deterioration of the status quo do various groups willing to 
accept the uncertainty associated with important structural changes. 
In response to the question why the financial crisis in 2008 has not led to more 
structural reforms of the financial sector, Drazen (2009) makes the following 
arguments: 
  The complexity of the crisis; 
  Crisis hypothesis must be refined to understand that adoption of structural 
reforms take time. Once the crisis has passed, financial market reform is an old 
problem. On the example of the global crisis, if the crisis hypothesis is true, the 
questions are why there were no major policy changes when it was perceived 
as a crisis and why if the crisis passed, financial reform legislation is still being 
discussed; 
  Special interests inside and outside government are often responsible for the 
lack of significant reforms in response to the crisis. 
Mircea Malița (2009, p. 49) believes that in fact “the crisis is above all a mental 
breakdown” and “to say that the system is recovering, but it keeps the ideas, 
prejudgements and bad practices, means that it take a break waiting for the next 
crisis”.  
When reform does not occur, the explanation given most often is that actually the 
crisis has not yet become sufficiently severe – for instance the ’90s crises  – and 
probably is expecting the next crisis – the crisis of 2008 – to reform the 
international monetary system.  
On the other hand, for a crisis to justify reform, the reform must be regarded as 
closely related to solving the crisis. In other words, between the cause of crisis 
and structural reform adopted must be a strong connection (e.g., adoption of the 
Securities Act and Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, during the Great Depression, after 
the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the banking panic of 1933). 
In his Nobel Prize speech, Robert Mundell (2000) highlights the role of monetary 
factors as a determinant of political events, arguing that many of the political 
changes of the twentieth century were caused by misunderstanding of the 
international monetary system disturbances, which were consequences of US 
growth and Federal Reserve System mistakes. Ramona Orăştean, Silvia Mărginean 
	
140 
Napoleon Pop (2008, p. 19) states that in the fight to purify the global crisis “- the 
crisis is the signal of the need for global body recovery – no need to find any 
winners or losers, but success. Why? Because in the first case may be either the 
ones or the others, while the success is necessary for all”. 
Based on Ivy Baker Priest quote, former Minister of Finance in USA – “The 
world is round and the place which may seem like the end may also be only the 
beginning”; Mugur Isărescu (2009, p.11) interprets this idea as “the main lesson 
arising from today's crisis, unless was the lesson that, probably, humanity had the 
sensation that it learned every time there was a crisis”. 
According to Marin Dinu (2010) actual crisis has become a crisis of choice 
solutions, the consequence of option for inconsistent approaches, of extreme 
nature, ideological. The author (Dinu, 2010, p. 9) presents two hypotheses of 
delayed exit from the current crisis: “the crisis is very persistent turbulence in the 
bifurcation of the path-specific system for creating wealth; it signals the end of the 
long cycle of the economy and the emergence of another long cycle of inclusive 
economy, global; crisis is both of the principles, means and purpose (a crisis of 
the system), and by appealing to classical solutions is extended the critical 
unchanged functioning of the system entering into a vicious loop”. In the first case 
we can talk about “the global opportunity for change that it implies (world is 
changing in the whole and the efforts to catch the wave are becoming 
fundamental)”. In the second case, “the change takes the aspect of amplification 
effort for reinforcement the vicious loop resistance, the crisis worsened cyclical 
and thus the crisis is not approached as an opportunity for radical change, but as a 
correction for renewing the paradigmatically continuity”. 
There are some authors that deny the need for reform considering that crises are 
nothing but an inevitable adjustment in response to periodic excesses (Little, 
Olivei, 1999). They assess that if the crises are the result of national policy 
mistakes, systemic reform could not be justified. 
Sceptic authors emphasize that the agreements regarding major repairs of the 
international monetary system occurred only in exceptional circumstances, 
usually as a result of wars, such as the agreement that led to the creation in 1944 
of the Bretton Woods system.  
The hypotheses that we can outline are: 
  That a crisis is necessary but not sufficient to induce reform. It was in the ’90s 
crises and is to be seen if it verifies in the context of the current global crisis. International monetary system – between crisis and reform 
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But it happened a reform of the international monetary system without a crisis, 
talking here about an important moment in the evolution of the international 
monetary system – the creation of the European Monetary Union in 1999. The 
Euro adoption led to one of the largest and most powerful trading blocs in the 
world, although only 17 of the 27 European Union members are now part of the 
eurozone. Although the Euro has not changed the structure of the Euro area with 
heterogeneous and independent countries, it undoubtedly strengthened the 
economic and political ties in the region and its weight in the world economy. 
From this perspective, the Euro has somewhat modified the global balance of 
power, redrawing the international monetary landscape. The Euro has become the 
first real competitor to the US dollar since the American currency exceed the 
British pound as dominant international currency in the interwar period, while the 
Japanese yen continued to play a minor role as an international currency. As the 
British pound has maintained its role as an international currency beyond the 
power of the British economy for half a century, the US dollar remains the main 
currency, the Euro bringing only a slight reduction while maintaining the gap 
between the US and Europe regarding the international monetary role.    
  That a crisis induces policy change and the reforms taking place in times of 
crisis. 
The crisis episodes generally determine the question about how the international 
monetary system is built. 
 
2.  Financial crises and the reform of the international monetary system 
The relation between crisis and reform of the international monetary system can 
be understood in the context of the causes of the crisis and its vulnerabilities, 
admitting the need for reform in this area. 
Current international monetary system is not a perfect one, its weaknesses are 
highlighted and analysed in Romanian and foreign literature in recent years. 
According to these some directions are emerging today discussing about the 
reform of the international monetary system and its organizational versions, 
which are very different, giving rise to a fervent debate and generating reference 
studies and articles.     
Analysing the functioning of the international monetary system in different 
periods it can be seen that each system had an operating period of no more than  
40 years: gold standard system – 40 years; gold exchange standard system – 30 years; 
Bretton Woods system – 29 years; post-Bretton Woods system – 40 years. Ramona Orăştean, Silvia Mărginean 
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Monetary and financial chronology of events shows that the international 
monetary system is not static, but is continuously evolving.  
Over time, the world economy has been subject of periodic financial crises: before 
World War I, due to globalization; in the gold standard system – Baring crisis in 
1890 and the US banking panic in 1907; in the interwar period – crisis in 1920-
1925 and the Great Depression in 1929-1933; in the Bretton Woods system, more 
rarely, as currency crises; in the post-Bretton Woods system, in the time of 
liberalization and financial globalization. 
Gradually, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a variety of exchange 
rates, predominantly the flexible one, the free movement of capital, the freedom in 
the choice of exchange rate regimes, an excessive fluctuation of exchange rates 
and the dominance of the dollar as a reserve currency were attained, in other 
words an international monetary system like the current one. 
The literature offers a number of typologies, chronologies and analyses of 
financial crises: Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001), 
Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Eichengreen (2008), 
Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010).  
The Great Depression of 1929-1933 was the result of an international monetary 
system with financial instability, severe imbalances and fixed exchange rates. 
By its turbulence and contagion, the financial crises of the ’90 in emerging 
markets – Mexico (1994-1995), South-East Asia (1997-1998), Russia (1998), 
Brazil (1998-1999) and Argentina (1999-2002) – caused a strong interest in the 
reform of the international monetary system not seen since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. These crises have revealed a number of weaknesses in the 
international monetary system which could justify a fundamental change. They 
have shown that the integration of emerging economies in the global system poses 
transformations that were not anticipated. Capital flows generated by capital 
account liberalization, capital market imperfections, fragility and insufficiently 
regulated financial systems caused financial, currency and banking crises.  
Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) have shown that since 
1973 the frequency of crises has doubled compared with Bretton Woods system or 
gold standard system and rival with crisis of 1929-1933. In other words, the crises 
became more frequent, but no more severe.  
Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) identified 38 financial crises during 1945-1971  
(21 in developed countries and 17 in emerging countries) and 139 in the period 
1973-1997 (44 in developed countries and 95 in emerging countries). International monetary system – between crisis and reform 
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The international monetary system has become a global one with new features and 
questions, its deviations at beginning in a form of functional crises turning into 
systemic crises.  
If the ’70s were marked by calling for a “new international monetary order”, the 
’90 – especially after South-East Asia, Russia and Brazil crises – have brought 
into question the need for a “new international monetary architecture”.  
The ’90s emerging market crises were managed by the IMF and the World Bank, 
in order to avoid global contagion and, in particular, expansion to developed 
countries. Even if they have not led to a reform of the international monetary 
system, these highlighted a number of important lessons: caution on liberalization 
of capital movements in developing countries; increased transparency that 
contributes to improved surveillance. 
After the crisis in South-East Asia the debate has taken another dimension. The 
phrase “reform the international financial architecture” was many years on the 
meeting agenda of international bodies, while remaining at the promise of reform. 
The global crisis of 2008 revealed the most serious global macroeconomic 
imbalances that have raised concerns in the functioning of the international 
monetary system and represent challenges for its reform. Major deficiencies of the 
current international monetary system – volatile capital flows, large and persistent 
imbalances in the balance of payments, volatility and misalignment of the 
exchange rate, excessive demand for reserve assets in emerging countries, 
inadequate global adjustment mechanisms – became its vulnerabilities, causing 
continued volatility in financial markets. The crisis that hit in the heart of the 
system highlighted the current international monetary system weaknesses that 
should be addressed through reform, and old fears resurfaced. These deficiencies 
are likely to be magnified by the rapid transformation of the global economy and 
growth in emerging economies, while the international monetary system failed to 
adjust itself.  
Economists have various views when considering the relationship between the 
global crisis and the current international monetary system. The literature on the 
international monetary system and the financial crisis is reviewed by Lin, 
Fardoust and Rosenblatt (2012). This relation can be understood in the context of 
the global crisis causes, where the debate is still on going. 
Some believe that global macroeconomic imbalances are the main cause of the 
crisis (Bernanke, 2009, Dunaway, 2009, Eichengreen, 2009, Krugman, 2009, Ramona Orăştean, Silvia Mărginean 
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Portes, 2009), while others argue that they only facilitate the development of the 
crisis (Obstfeld, Rogoff, 2009, Roubini, Mihm, 2010, Borio, Disyatat, 2011). 
On the other side, there are authors who believe that the current monetary system 
– through its weaknesses – was a trigger of the financial imbalances that led to the 
global crisis. 
Whelan (2010) explains how European banks have played a major role in external 
financing of credit expansion in the United States, many of them facing serious 
financial problems when the toxic nature of the assets was brought out, this 
representing an important mechanism for widespread transmission of the US 
problems.  
Eichengreen (2011) notes the role of the international monetary system and the 
US dollar in crisis, identifying causal chains. 
Farhi, Gourinchas and Rey (2011) consider the absence of a systematic 
mechanism for sufficient and coordinated supply of liquidity a major weakness of 
the current system. 
Lin and Treichel (2012) argue that the cause of the crisis was financial 
deregulation combined with the loose monetary policy, facilitated by the role of 
the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency. 
The US dollar was a world “safe haven” but also benefited from a lack of viable 
alternatives. The US dollar still retains a dominant position, which was partially 
influenced by the Euro and, today and especially in the future, it could be 
influenced by the growing importance of China and other emerging countries. In 
such a world there is room for more than one currency, as Eichengreen (2007) 
said. 
 
3.  Conclusions 
We believe that the current international monetary system, through its 
shortcomings, fragility and the dominance of the US dollar as reserve currency, 
contributed to global crisis and threaten the global economic outlook. Basically, 
the transmission mechanism of global crisis was the global monetary and financial 
system. On the other hand, the major global economic imbalances reveal also a 
failure of the functioning of the international monetary system institutions.  
The interest in international monetary system reform has intensified since the 
frequency and size of the financial crises have increased, becoming more severe, 
more costly and less predictable. Policymakers, financial analysts and academic International monetary system – between crisis and reform 
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economists should focus their efforts on designing an international monetary 
system compatible with the current power configuration of the world economy, 
that through the features, principles, operations and institutions to be resilient to 
shocks in the long term and minimize the risk of another global crisis. 
Taking as reference Reinhart and Rogoff's statement (2008) – which believes that 
most crisis episodes created the illusion among policy makers and investors that 
“this time is different” – we can only hope that “this time will be different” and 
there will be a profound reform of the international monetary system. 
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